hermes
ce6f5b7962
The review was right on both counts, and both are fixed.
1. MITM. Fetching the CA over an unverified connection (`curl -sk`) and then
trusting it is a privilege-escalation hole: the runner holds cluster-admin
credentials, so an attacker able to intercept the fetch could hand us a CA
of their choosing and then read everything sent over the connection.
The CA is now PINNED. It is still fetched over an insecure connection, but
it is only USED if its SHA-256 fingerprint matches
`KUBE_SERVER_CA_FINGERPRINT`. An intercepted CA will not hash to the
pinned value, so it is refused. If the secret is not set, the job fails
rather than trusting an unverified CA.
2. The hardcoded cluster name. `kubectl config set-cluster default` creates a
NEW cluster entry when the kubeconfig's entry is called something else,
leaving the original (and its stale CA) in use. The name is now read from
the kubeconfig: `{.clusters[0].name}`.
The bash is also moved out of the YAML into `scripts/kube-ca-refresh.sh`, so
it can be read, reviewed and tested on its own rather than as a wall of
shell inside a workflow file.
All three paths are tested against the live API server:
- no fingerprint supplied -> refuses, exit 1
- wrong fingerprint -> refuses, exit 1
- correct fingerprint -> refreshes the CA, exit 0, kubectl then works
93 lines
3.2 KiB
Bash
Executable File
93 lines
3.2 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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#
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# Make sure kubectl can talk to the cluster API server.
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#
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# The kubeconfig embeds the k3s server CA. If the cluster's CA has been
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# rotated since the secret was created, kubectl fails with:
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#
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# tls: failed to verify certificate: x509: certificate signed by unknown authority
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#
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# which reads like a network problem rather than a stale secret. This script
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# refreshes the CA in place.
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#
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# The refresh is PINNED: the server's CA is fetched over an unverified
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# connection, but it is only used if its SHA-256 fingerprint matches the value
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# in the KUBE_SERVER_CA_FINGERPRINT secret. An attacker able to intercept
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# the fetch cannot use it - their CA will not hash to the pinned fingerprint.
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# The runner has cluster-admin credentials, so trusting an unverified CA here
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# would be a privilege-escalation hole.
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#
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# Usage:
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# kube-ca-refresh.sh <expected-fingerprint>
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#
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# Exit codes:
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# 0 the cluster is reachable
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# 1 the cluster is not reachable and could not be fixed safely
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set -euo pipefail
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EXPECTED="${1:-}"
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if kubectl version --request-timeout=15s >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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echo "cluster reachable"
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exit 0
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fi
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if [ -z "$EXPECTED" ]; then
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echo "ERROR: the kubeconfig cannot verify the API server, and no expected CA" >&2
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echo " fingerprint was supplied, so the CA cannot be refreshed safely." >&2
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echo " Set KUBE_SERVER_CA_FINGERPRINT to the SHA-256 fingerprint of the" >&2
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echo " cluster's CA:" >&2
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echo " openssl x509 -in server-ca.crt -noout -fingerprint -sha256" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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SERVER=$(kubectl config view --raw -o jsonpath='{.clusters[0].cluster.server}')
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# The cluster entry's NAME - patching the CA into a *new* entry named
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# "default" would leave the original entry (and its stale CA) in use.
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CLUSTER_NAME=$(kubectl config view --raw -o jsonpath='{.clusters[0].name}')
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echo "server: $SERVER cluster entry: $CLUSTER_NAME"
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CA_FILE=$(mktemp)
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trap 'rm -f "$CA_FILE"' EXIT
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curl -sk "$SERVER/cacerts" -o "$CA_FILE"
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if [ ! -s "$CA_FILE" ]; then
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echo "ERROR: could not fetch the cluster CA from $SERVER/cacerts" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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# Normalise both to lowercase hex without separators, so the comparison does
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# not depend on the colon-separated format openssl prints.
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normalise() {
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tr -d ':' | tr 'A-Z' 'a-z'
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}
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ACTUAL=$(openssl x509 -in "$CA_FILE" -noout -fingerprint -sha256 | cut -d= -f2 | normalise)
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WANTED=$(printf '%s' "$EXPECTED" | normalise)
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echo "expected CA fingerprint: $WANTED"
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echo "actual CA fingerprint: $ACTUAL"
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if [ "$ACTUAL" != "$WANTED" ]; then
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echo "ERROR: the cluster CA does not match the pinned fingerprint." >&2
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echo " Refusing to use it. Either the CA has been rotated and the" >&2
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echo " fingerprint secret needs updating, or the connection was" >&2
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echo " intercepted." >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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# The fingerprint matches the pinned value, so this is the CA we expect.
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kubectl config set-cluster "$CLUSTER_NAME" \
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--embed-certs=true \
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--certificate-authority="$CA_FILE" >/dev/null
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if kubectl version --request-timeout=15s >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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echo "cluster reachable after refreshing the CA"
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exit 0
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fi
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echo "ERROR: cannot reach the cluster API server even with a refreshed CA." >&2
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echo " The kubeconfig secret may be stale or invalid." >&2
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exit 1
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