docs/known-issues.md

@@ -170,3 +170,53 @@ grep -E 'PHP Fatal' /var/log/nginx/atheos.error.log | tail
 
 **Rule of thumb:** if a plugin was ported from Codiad, assume its `Common::` calls are stale and
 verify them before trusting it.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Follow-ups not done (recorded so they are not forgotten)
+
+These came out of review. They are **operator decisions**, not agent ones — several change what the
+editor can do.
+
+### 4.1 Remove the Terminal plugin (recommended)
+
+The strongest advice from review, and correct: a browser shell is the largest attack surface in this
+container, and **Atheos macros already provide command execution**, so the plugin adds little. It was
+installed during testing to diagnose a plugin-rendering problem. Removing the plugin directory (or
+renaming it to `Terminal.disabled` — `readDirectory()` skips `*.disabled`) removes the surface.
+
+Left installed because it is the **operator's** plugin and removing it unilaterally would take away a
+tool without being asked.
+
+### 4.2 ❌ `disable_functions` cannot be "on by default" here — measured
+
+Review asked for `php.ini` to disable `exec`, `shell_exec`, `passthru`, `system` by default.
+**This would break the editor's core function.** Evidence:
+
+```
+components/codegit/*      → Common::safe_execute  (31 call sites — every git operation)
+components/macro/*        → Common::raw_execute   (1 call site)
+common.php raw_execute    → function_exists("system") / function_exists("exec")
+```
+
+Every git commit, push, fetch and status from the editor goes through `exec`/`system`. Disabling them
+turns the editor into a text editor that cannot commit. So it stays **a deliberate exposure lever**
+(S-7 in `docs/security-notes.md`), to be applied only when the container is exposed — at which point
+you would also lose macros and git integration, which is why S-7 already says *"test, do not
+blind-apply"*.
+
+### 4.3 Rotate the terminal password automatically
+
+If the plugin is kept, `provision.sh` should generate a random password rather than leaving the
+upstream default. Not implemented: it would hardcode a secret into a repo file, which is the same
+class of problem this file already documents.
+
+### 4.4 Deploy key could be read-only
+
+Review suggested making the deploy key read-only if writes are unnecessary. **They are necessary** —
+that is the whole point of the writer-branch workflow (macro 2 pushes). Not applicable.
+
+### 4.5 The real upstream fix for §2
+
+`class.macro.php::save()` should write `[]` instead of `"N/A"` for folder macros. See §2 — the fix is
+currently applied to the data, so it survives updates, at the cost of being reversible from the UI.