c65900638ecef18bbca1df48548f36f85886d6e6
3
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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c4a4de1da7 |
fix: rDelete fataled on musl (GLOB_BRACE) - broke ALL deletion and plugin removal
Reported as "deleting terminal just cycles in the ui". Root cause is much larger than the
plugin: it was a platform bug that broke deletion everywhere.
CAUSE
traits/helpers.php::rDelete() did:
glob($target . "{*,.[!.]*,..?*}", GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_MARK);
GLOB_BRACE is a GLIBC extension. Alpine is musl, where the constant is undefined,
and referencing an undefined constant is a FATAL in PHP 8:
PHP Fatal error: Uncaught Error: Undefined constant "GLOB_BRACE"
in traits/helpers.php:138
#0 components/market/class.market.php(178): Common::rDelete()
#1 components/market/controller.php(46): Market->remove()
The fatal kills the request before Common::send(200), so the front end never gets a
settle response and the UI spins forever. A hang, not an error - which is why it
presented as "cycles in the ui".
BLAST RADIUS (measured, two call sites)
components/market/class.market.php:178 removing a plugin from the market
components/filetree/class.filetree.php:59 DELETING ANY FILE OR FOLDER IN THE EDITOR
The second is core functionality, so this was never a plugin bug - installing the
Terminal plugin is just what made it visible.
FIX
patches/helpers-rDelete-GLOB_BRACE.diff - expand the brace pattern by hand when
GLOB_BRACE is undefined, keeping upstream behaviour where it is defined. Verified:
nested dirs + dotfiles + single files all delete correctly now.
Upstream has NOT fixed this (checked main) so it cannot be resolved by updating.
PLUGIN REMOVED
Once deletion worked, removal via the market succeeded and the plugin is now gone:
{"text":"Plugin successfully removed.","status":200}
That is the right end state - a browser shell was the largest attack surface, and
macros already provide command execution. Removed through the market's own code path
so the plugin list, addons cache and bundle stayed consistent.
TESTS (now 42 passed, 1 failed - the failure is branch protection, a genuine open item)
+ a GLOB_BRACE regression guard that fails loudly if the patch is lost to an update
+ the identity guard is INVERTED: FR-11 required an EMPTY identity so the agent could
not impersonate the operator, but the operator has since asked for it to be set, so
the test asserting emptiness was asserting the opposite of the current design. It
now requires the identity to be present and to NOT look agent-generated.
docs/known-issues.md: new section 1 documents the GLOB_BRACE fault in full, including the
honest note that this is the real cost of choosing Alpine over a glibc base image.
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0b72cf48b1 |
test: add a master-protection guard, fix three stale assertions
Responds to the independent review of the writer-branch PR.
Adopted (the reviewer's strongest recommendation): a test that PROVES master is
protected, rather than documenting the setting. It attempts a direct push to
master with the deploy key and requires it to be rejected - the same way an
attacker would find out. It currently FAILS, which is the correct result: branch
protection is genuinely not enabled on armistace/blog, and the failure is now
visible in every test run instead of buried in prose.
Cannot fix from here: setting branch protection on armistace/blog returns
403 "user should be an owner or a collaborator with admin write"
for the bot account (it is a collaborator, not the owner). This is an operator
action, documented in docs/writer-branch-workflow.md with the exact Gitea
settings. Until it is done the writer-branch model is advisory, not enforced.
Also fixed three assertions that were stale rather than wrong:
- "installer markers present" now accepts the post-install state (config.php
populated) as valid, since the operator has completed the installer.
- "posts found == 20" is now ">= 20" - the operator has added a file, so an
exact count was always going to fail.
- "branch == master" is now master|atheos-writer - the writer branch is the
intended steady state under the new workflow, so asserting master was
asserting the opposite of the design.
Result: 40 passed, 1 failed - the single failure being the branch-protection gap.
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a6fb61d0ea |
feat: provision Alpine LXC 136 running Atheos, wired to Gitea
Provisions a LAN-only browser code editor (Atheos) in an Alpine 3.23 LXC on the scotty PVE node, with armistace/blog cloned and ready to edit. Built via the AI-DLC workflow; the full process trail is in aidlc-docs/. Deliverables - scripts/provision.sh rebuild the guest from scratch (re-runnable) - scripts/update-atheos.sh move Atheos to latest upstream and RE-PIN - scripts/build-and-test.sh captures evidence for every acceptance criterion - files/atheos.conf nginx vhost (socket path byte-matches the FPM pool) - files/ssh-config ~atheos/.ssh/config deploy-key alias - RUNBOOK.md operational guide (START AT STEP 1) - docs/security-notes.md credential model + wider-web hardening TODOs - docs/resiliency-notes.md what a non-PoC deployment would need Design decisions - D1 no git identity is configured by the agent; the operator sets it. Git will refuse the first commit until then, which is deliberate (requirement FR-11). - D2 Atheos pinned to commit f90cd18 (build 611) with a verified tarball sha256, plus update-atheos.sh as the deliberate escape hatch. - D3 nginx :80, web root /var/www/atheos, php-fpm over a unix socket. - D6 git auth is a per-repository DEPLOY KEY scoped to armistace/blog, not a personal access token (a PAT's write:repository scope reaches every repo the account can write). Verified on the live guest (40 checks, 0 failures) - AC-2 Atheos served over HTTP 200 by nginx+php-fpm; socket paths byte-match - AC-3 20 posts + themes/cleanblog present; owned by the php-fpm user - AC-4 all five writable paths writable as the service user - AC-5 remote targets armistace/blog; deploy key authenticates over SSH - AC-6 survival proven with a real container restart, marker byte-identical - AC-8 no python/pelican/pip/make and no DB engine - scope boundary enforced - FR-11 git identity is empty; deploy key mode 600 owned by the service user Traps documented in the RUNBOOK (each cost real debugging time) - The Gitea SSH user is `gitea`, NOT `git` (app.ini SSH_USER=gitea). With `git`, sshd answers "Invalid user git" and rejects before reading authorized_keys, which is indistinguishable from a bad key. - The Gitea SSH endpoint is the LAN address (:22 is not forwarded publicly). - `uptime` and `free` report the PVE HOST inside an LXC without lxcfs, so a container that just restarted can claim days of uptime. |