edits to provide slightly more context to the content

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src/content/an_actual_solution_to_the_social_media_ban.md

@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ Summary: The Social Media ban is an abject failure of policy. I propose an actua
 
 The Australian Government recently announced it would be “watering down” the requirements of the upcoming legislation regarding online safety. The irony isn’t lost on anyone observing the situation. Specifically, the planned mandatory minimum “flag rate” for underage detection technology has been dropped – a clear indication that initial testing proved unachievable. Furthermore, the legislation now only requires tech companies to demonstrate “reasonable steps” to remove children from their platforms.
 
-Let’s be frank: this legislation, as it stands, achieves very little. Experts in the field consistently warned that the approach was flawed and ignored industry input. The result? Parents are arguably in a worse position than before. The focus on punitive measures, rather than practical solutions, has been a misstep, and the relentless pursuit of this agenda by the eSafety Commissioner feels increasingly disconnected from reality.
+Let’s be frank: this legislation, as it stands, achieves very little. Experts in the field consistently warned that the proposed age verification approach was flawed and ignored industry input. The result? Parents are arguably in a worse position than before. The focus on punitive measures, rather than practical solutions, has been a misstep, and the relentless pursuit of this agenda by the eSafety Commissioner feels increasingly disconnected from reality.
 
-It’s important to state that criticism of this legislation isn’t an endorsement of big tech. While I’m actively working to reduce my own reliance on these platforms, this situation was never about punishing companies. It was about the Australian Government overreaching in an area where it lacks the necessary expertise and, frankly, the authority. The driving force behind this appears to be a personal vendetta, fuelled by someone unfamiliar with the fundamental principles of how the internet operates.
+It’s important to state that criticism of this legislation isn’t an endorsement of big tech, in fact I’m actively working to reduce my own reliance on these platforms. It is about the Australian Government overreaching in an area where it lacks the necessary expertise and, frankly, the authority. The driving force behind this appears to be a personal vendetta, fuelled by someone unfamiliar with the fundamental principles of how the internet operates.
 
 So, with the current legislation effectively neutered, what *can* the government do to genuinely help parents navigate the challenges of online safety? I believe there’s a technically feasible solution that doesn’t involve trampling on privacy or creating massive security vulnerabilities.
 
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ The answer lies in a system we’ve been using for decades: the Domain Name Syst
 
 Most people rely on the DNS provided by their Internet Service Provider (ISP) or the manufacturer of their router. However, it’s possible to change this setting. Popular alternatives include Cloudflare’s 1.1.1.1, Google’s 8.8.8.8, and paid family-friendly options like OpenDNS. For those with more technical expertise, it’s even possible to run your own DNS server – I personally use Pi-hole to block ads at the network level.
 
-This existing infrastructure offers a unique opportunity. The Chinese government has long leveraged DNS for its “Great Firewall,” demonstrating its capability for large-scale internet control. While that application raises obvious concerns, the underlying technology itself isn’t inherently malicious.
+This existing infrastructure offers a unique opportunity. The Chinese government has long leveraged DNS as part of its “Great Firewall,” demonstrating its capability for large-scale internet censorship and control. While that application raises obvious concerns, the underlying technology itself isn’t inherently malicious and is a good fit for the purposes of *opt in* age verification.
 
 <img alt="Current DNS" height="auto" width="100%" src="{attach}/images/dns_currently.png">
 
@@ -31,11 +31,13 @@ My proposal is straightforward: the Australian Government could establish a larg
 
 This DNS server could be *optionally* configured on any router, with ISPs assisting less technically inclined customers. The result? Access to certain websites from that router would require passing through the government’s age verification process.
 
-The authentication could be managed by an adult in the household, providing a valid identity document to establish a secure connection. Mobile phones could also be updated by manufacturers to incorporate this DNS setting.
+The authentication could be managed by an adult in the household, providing a valid identity document to receive some form of auth mechanism to establish allow the user to continue to their restricted website.
 
-This would allow for the creation of “Government-certified” or “Family-Friendly” devices – routers or phones pre-configured with this DNS server – ensuring a consistent level of online safety. These devices could be subsidised by the government to ensure accessibility for all families.
+Mobile phones could also have the internal DNS updated by manufacturers to incorporate this DNS setting.
 
-Crucially, this system is optional. Individuals who prefer to manage their own online security – as I do – would remain unaffected. However, for parents who lack the technical skills or desire to implement their own solutions, this offers a practical and effective alternative.
+This would allow for the creation of “Government-certified” or “Family-Friendly” devices – routers or phones pre-configured with this DNS server – ensuring a consistent level of online safety as defined by the Australian Government. These devices could be subsidised by the government to ensure accessibility for all families.
+
+Crucially, this system is optional. Individuals who prefer to manage their own online security – as I do – would remain unaffected. However, for parents who lack the technical skills or desire to implement their own solutions, this offers a practical and effective alternative to managing their child’s online safety.
 
 This approach also avoids the need to collect and store sensitive identity data offshore. No tech company needs to be involved in the verification process, and the skills to build and maintain this system already exist within the Australian public service.